The Appeals Process and Adjudicator Incentives

40 Pages Posted: 20 Nov 2004

See all articles by Steven Shavell

Steven Shavell

Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2004

Abstract

The appeals process - whereby litigants can have decisions of adjudicators reviewed by a higher authority - is a general feature of formal legal systems (and of many private decisionmaking procedures). It leads to the making of better decisions, because it constitutes a threat to adjudicators whose decisions would deviate too much from socially desirable ones. Further, it yields this benefit without absorbing resources to the extent that adjudicators can anticipate when appeals would occur and would thus make decisions to forestall the actual occurrence of appeals.

JEL Classification: D8, K41

Suggested Citation

Shavell, Steven, The Appeals Process and Adjudicator Incentives (August 2004). Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 485. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=623284 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.623284

Steven Shavell (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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