R&D Networks Among Unionized Firms

56 Pages Posted: 1 Dec 2004

See all articles by Ana Mauleon

Ana Mauleon

Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles; Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

José J. Sempere-Monerris

University of Valencia - Department of Economic Analysis

Vincent J. Vannetelbosch

Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Date Written: April 2005

Abstract

We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability and efficiency of R&D collaboration networks in an oligopolistic industry with three firms. Whenever firms settle wages, the complete network is always pairwise stable and the partially connected network is stable if and only if spillovers are large enough. If spillovers are small, the complete network is the efficient network; otherwise, the efficient network is the partially connected network. Thus, a conflict between stability and efficiency may occur: efficient networks are pairwise stable, but the reverse is not true. Strong stability even reinforces this conflict. However, once unions settle wages such conflict disappears: the complete network is the unique pairwise and strongly stable network and is the efficient network whatever the spillovers.

Keywords: Networks, R&D collaboration, oligopoly, unions

JEL Classification: C70, L13, L20, J50, J52

Suggested Citation

Mauleon Echeverria, Ana Carmen and Sempere-Monerris, Jose J. and Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., R&D Networks Among Unionized Firms (April 2005). FEEM Working Paper No. 49.05; CORE Discussion Paper No. 2004/71. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=624484 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.624484

Ana Carmen Mauleon Echeverria (Contact Author)

Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles ( email )

Brussels, 1000
Belgium

Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) ( email )

34 Voie du Roman Pays
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, b-1348
Belgium

Jose J. Sempere-Monerris

University of Valencia - Department of Economic Analysis ( email )

Campus de los Naranjos
46022 Valencia
Spain

Vincent J. Vannetelbosch

Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) ( email )

34 Voie du Roman Pays
1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, 1348
Belgium

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