Structuring Securities Regulation in the European Union: Lessons from the U.S. Experience

37 Pages Posted: 7 Dec 2004

Date Written: May 2005

Abstract

Politics aside, the question of whether the EU should create an SEC is about the trade-offs between scale and accountability. This paper considers that trade-off in the U.S. context, with specific attention the SEC's apparent role as a "global" securities regulator on matters relating to issuer disclosure. The principal claim is that in making enforcement decisions, there will likely be a "home bias" toward domestic enforcement actions that makes extraterritorial actions less likely, thus reducing the incentives to comply. To the extent that this is typical of regulatory behavior, then there may be lessons for Europeans considering the question of institutional design. More broadly, the paper also considers some of the institutional features that make SEC enforcement policy what it is, which may or may not be exportable (or which policy makers in Europe may not want to import) to the European context.

Keywords: securities regulation, enforcement, fraud, Securities and Exchange Commission

JEL Classification: K22 , K42

Suggested Citation

Langevoort, Donald C., Structuring Securities Regulation in the European Union: Lessons from the U.S. Experience (May 2005). Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 624582, ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 41/2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=624582 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.624582

Donald C. Langevoort (Contact Author)

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States
202-662-9832 (Phone)
202-662-9412 (Fax)

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