A Note on Pareto Improving Lotteries in Voluntary Public Good Provision

12 Pages Posted: 1 Dec 2004

Date Written: November 2004

Abstract

This paper characterizes the utility possibility frontier resulting in a model of private voluntary provision of a public good. It is shown that ex-ante lotteries over resource distributions among the players can be Pareto improving. A corollary is that an equal distribution of resources among the agents, or any distribution where all agents contribute in equilibrium, is always Pareto dominated by a lottery between two unequal distributions.

Keywords: Public goods, private provision, lotteries, Pareto efficiency

JEL Classification: H41, D31

Suggested Citation

Karaivanov, Alexander, A Note on Pareto Improving Lotteries in Voluntary Public Good Provision (November 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=625347 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.625347

Alexander Karaivanov (Contact Author)

Simon Fraser University ( email )

8888 University Drive
Burnaby, V5A1S6
Canada