Download This PaperA Note on Pareto Improving Lotteries in Voluntary Public Good Provision
12 Pages Posted: 1 Dec 2004
Date Written: November 2004
Abstract
This paper characterizes the utility possibility frontier resulting in a model of private voluntary provision of a public good. It is shown that ex-ante lotteries over resource distributions among the players can be Pareto improving. A corollary is that an equal distribution of resources among the agents, or any distribution where all agents contribute in equilibrium, is always Pareto dominated by a lottery between two unequal distributions.
Keywords: Public goods, private provision, lotteries, Pareto efficiency
JEL Classification: H41, D31
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Karaivanov, Alexander, A Note on Pareto Improving Lotteries in Voluntary Public Good Provision (November 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=625347 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.625347
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