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Rethinking International Insolvency: The Neglected Role of Choice-of-Law Rules and Theory

50 Pages Posted: 3 Dec 2004  

Hannah L. Buxbaum

Indiana University Bloomington Maurer School of Law

Abstract

Solutions to the problem of international bankruptcy are generally framed as either universalist (arguing that international bankruptcies should be administered in a single forum) or territorialist (arguing in favor of multiple local bankruptcies). This article seeks to expand this debate by using traditional conflicts theory to examine the problem of cross-border bankruptcy. It analyzes the current regime under which cross-border bankruptcies are administered in U.S. courts, concluding that this regime operates as a multilateralist (jurisdiction-selecting) regime. Concluding that multilateralism is an appropriate method for resolving choice-of-law issues in international insolvency, the article analyzes some possible refinements to the current system. It argues that a more pointedly multilateralist approach would better serve the goals of the international bankruptcy regime.

Keywords: International bankruptcy, international insolvency, choice-of-law, comity

Suggested Citation

Buxbaum, Hannah L., Rethinking International Insolvency: The Neglected Role of Choice-of-Law Rules and Theory. Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol. 36, No. 23, 2000. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=626461

Hannah L. Buxbaum (Contact Author)

Indiana University Bloomington Maurer School of Law ( email )

211 S. Indiana Avenue
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

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