The Board of Directors and the Adoption of Poison Pills
Posted: 22 May 1995
Abstract
In this paper we analyze how the stock-market reaction to the adoption of poison pills and the subsequent outcome of takeover attempts vary with the composition of the firm's shares among competing bidders and by other firms to entrench managers at the shareholders' expense. Our results also suggest that outside directors can be important in helping to align the interests of the board with the interests of shareholders.
JEL Classification: G10
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Brickley, James A. and Coles, Jeffrey L. and Terry, Rory L., The Board of Directors and the Adoption of Poison Pills. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6270
James A. Brickley (Contact Author)
University of Rochester - Simon Business School ( email )
Carol Simon Hall 3-160L
Rochester, NY 14627
United States
585-275-3433 (Phone)
585-442-6323 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium
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