The Evolution of Ownership and Control in German Ipos: A Dynamic Analysis

Posted: 3 Nov 1998

See all articles by Marc Goergen

Marc Goergen

IE Business School, IE University; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: February 1995

Abstract

This paper provides an alternative analysis of German IPOs by looking at the evolution of control and ownership. Most companies are floated by families and in a majority of companies control stays with the family six years after the flotation. Control is not gradually dispersed by sales on the market, but is directly transferred to the new controlling shareholder. There is a positive relationship between the stake size of the family and the family members sitting on the supervisory and management boards. The seats held by banks on the supervisory boards date back to the time before the IPO and do not depend on holdings by the banks.

JEL Classification: G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Goergen, Marc, The Evolution of Ownership and Control in German Ipos: A Dynamic Analysis (February 1995 ). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6271

Marc Goergen (Contact Author)

IE Business School, IE University ( email )

Finance Department
Maria de Molina, 12
Madrid, 28006
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://www.ie.edu/business-school/faculty-and-research/faculty/marc-goergen/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

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