The Equal Split-Off Set for Cooperative Games

CentER Discussion Paper No. 2004-110

15 Pages Posted: 7 Dec 2004

See all articles by Rodica Branzei

Rodica Branzei

'A.l. Cuza' University of Iasi, Romania - Faculty of Computer Sciences

Dinko Dimitrov

Bielefeld University - Institute of Mathematical Economics

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research; Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Date Written: November 2004

Abstract

In this paper the equal split-off set is introduced as a new solution concept for cooperative games. This solution is based on egalitarian considerations and it turns out that for superadditive games the equal split-off set is a subset of the equal division core. Moreover, the proposed solution is single valued on the class of convex games and it coincides with the Dutta-Ray constrained egalitarian solution.

Keywords: Convex games, egalitarianism, equal split-off set, superadditive games

JEL Classification: C71

Suggested Citation

Branzei, Rodica and Dimitrov, Dinko and Tijs, Stef H., The Equal Split-Off Set for Cooperative Games (November 2004). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2004-110, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=627428 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.627428

Rodica Branzei (Contact Author)

'A.l. Cuza' University of Iasi, Romania - Faculty of Computer Sciences ( email )

Carol I Blvd, Nr.11
Iasi
Romania

Dinko Dimitrov

Bielefeld University - Institute of Mathematical Economics ( email )

Postfach 10 01 31
Bielefeld, D-33501
Germany

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
B925
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2348 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Via Dodecaneso 35
16146 Genoa
Italy

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
101
Abstract Views
1,001
Rank
523,786
PlumX Metrics