Bankruptcy Courts and Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts on Delaware

Posted: 26 Feb 1998

See all articles by David A. Skeel

David A. Skeel

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 1998

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to consider both the merits of the recent Delaware venue controversy-is Delaware venue a good or a bad thing?-- and the question whether efforts to eliminate Delaware bankruptcy venue are likely to succeed. In doing so, I will place particular emphasis on two perspectives that are almost entirely lacking in the existing debate.

First, both proponents and critics of Delaware venue have failed to fully consider the relationship between Delaware's rise to prominence in bankruptcy and its role in corporate law generally. I argue that the two are integrally related. Just as the efforts of Delaware and other states to attract corporations have induced Delaware to regulate corporate law in a generally efficient manner, the same forces will have a beneficial effort on Delaware's bankruptcy judges.

Second, the article offers a detailed historical perspective on the venue controversy. I focus in particular on a series of debates in the 1930s that raised almost precisely the same issues that are being addressed today. Not only does the historical analysis underscore the connection between Delaware venue and Delaware's role in corporate law generally, but it also provides important insights into the political question of whether venue reform is likely to be adopted.

While my analysis focuses on the Delaware venue controversy, it is important to emphasize that preserving the existing framework is only one way to use venue decisions to improve the performance of bankruptcy judges. I briefly decision two other approaches as well, "domicile-only" venue and contractual choice of venue.

JEL Classification: G33, G38, K22

Suggested Citation

Skeel, David A., Bankruptcy Courts and Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts on Delaware (January 1998). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=62870

David A. Skeel (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-573-9859 (Phone)
215-573-2025 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
1,183
PlumX Metrics