Post-Cartel Pricing During Litigation

17 Pages Posted: 21 Dec 2004

See all articles by Joseph E. Harrington

Joseph E. Harrington

Johns Hopkins University - Department of Economics

Abstract

Standard methods in the U.S. for calculating antitrust damages in price-fixing cases are shown to create a strategic incentive for firms to price above the non-collusive price after the cartel has been dissolved. This results in an overestimate of the but for price and an underestimate of the level of damages. The extent of this upward bias in the but for price is greater, the longer the cartel was in place and the more concentrated the industry.

Suggested Citation

Harrington, Joseph E., Post-Cartel Pricing During Litigation. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=629959

Joseph E. Harrington (Contact Author)

Johns Hopkins University - Department of Economics ( email )

3400 Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 21218-2685
United States
410-516-7615 (Phone)
410-516-7600 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
37
Abstract Views
1,243
PlumX Metrics