On Law Enforcement with Boundedly Rational Actors

20 Pages Posted: 7 Dec 2004

See all articles by Christine Jolls

Christine Jolls

Yale Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: September 2004

Abstract

This essay, prepared for The Law and Economics of Irrational Behavior (Francesco Parisi and Vernon Smith, eds., 2004), examines implications of bounded rationality for traditional economic analysis of public law enforcement. A brief application to the enforcement of employment discrimination laws by public agents is offered.

JEL Classification: K14, K42

Suggested Citation

Jolls, Christine, On Law Enforcement with Boundedly Rational Actors (September 2004). Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 494. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=631222 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.631222

Christine Jolls (Contact Author)

Yale Law School ( email )

127 Wall Street
New Haven, CT 06520
United States
203.432.1958 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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