Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market

49 Pages Posted: 15 Dec 2004

See all articles by Atif R. Mian

Atif R. Mian

Princeton University - Department of Economics; Princeton University - Princeton School of Public and International Affairs; NBER

Asim Ijaz Khwaja

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS); Center for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies (CeRP); Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development (BREAD); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2004

Abstract

Corruption by the politically connected is often blamed for economic ills, particularly in less developed economies. Using a loan-level data set of more than 90,000 firms that represents the universe of corporate lending in Pakistan between 1996 and 2002, we investigate rents to politically connected firms in banking. Classifying a firm as political if its director participates in an election, we examine the extent, nature, and economic costs of political rent provision. We find that political firms borrow twice as much and have 50% higher default rates. Such preferential treatment occurs exclusively in government banks - private banks provide no political favors. Using firm fixed effects and exploiting variation across time or lenders, we show that the observed political preference is driven by the political status of the firm and not by any unobserved firm characteristic. The political rents thus identified increase with the strength of the firm's politician and whether he or his party is in power, and fall with the degree of electoral participation in his constituency. We provide direct evidence that rules out alternative explanations such as socially motivated lending by government banks to politicians. The economy wide costs of the rents identified are estimated to be 0.3% to 1.9% of GDP every year.

Suggested Citation

Mian, Atif R. and Khwaja, Asim Ijaz, Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market (December 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=631703 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.631703

Atif R. Mian (Contact Author)

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

Princeton University - Princeton School of Public and International Affairs ( email )

Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

NBER

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Asim Ijaz Khwaja

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-384-7790 (Phone)
617-496-5960 (Fax)

Center for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies (CeRP) ( email )

Via Real Collegio, 30
Moncalieri, Turin 10024
Italy

Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development (BREAD) ( email )

Duke University
Durham, NC 90097
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
981
Abstract Views
12,892
Rank
43,174
PlumX Metrics