Political Cycles in a Developing Economy: Effect of Elections in Indian States

54 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Stuti Khemani

Stuti Khemani

World Bank; World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Date Written: September 1, 2000


Empirical results from India suggest that politicians exert greater effort in managing public works during election years. Surprisingly, there is no evidence of a populist spending spree to sway voters just before elections.

Khemani studies the effect of state legislative assembly elections on the policies of state governments in 14 major states of India, from 1960 to 1994. She identifies the effect of the timing of elections using an instrument for the electoral cycle that distinguishes between constitutionally scheduled elections and midterm polls. She contrasts two levers of policy manipulation-fiscal policy and public service delivery-to distinguish between alternative models of political cycles. The predictions of three models are tested:

- Populist cycles to woo uninformed and myopic voters.

- Signaling models with asymmetric information.

- A moral hazard model with high discounting by political agents.

The empirical results for fiscal policy show that election years have a negative effect on some commodity taxes, a positive effect on investment spending, but no effect on deficits, primarily because consumption spending is reduced. With regard to public service delivery, elections have a positive and large effect on road construction by state public works departments. Strikingly, the fiscal effects are much smaller than the effect on roads.

Khemani argues that the pattern of evidence is inconsistent with the predictions of models of voter myopia and asymmetric information. She explores an alternative moral hazard model in which the cycle is generated by high political discounting and career concerns persuade politicans to exert greater effort in election years on the management of public works.

This paper - a product of Public Economics, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the effect of political institutions on public policy. The author may be contacted at skhemani@worldbank.org.

Suggested Citation

Khemani, Stuti, Political Cycles in a Developing Economy: Effect of Elections in Indian States (September 1, 2000). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=632524

Stuti Khemani (Contact Author)

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/skhemani

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

1818 H. Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

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