Synergies in Recurring Procurement Auctions: An Empirical Investigation

Posted: 23 Dec 2004

See all articles by Dakshina G. De Silva

Dakshina G. De Silva

Department of Economics, Lancaster University Management School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of synergies on bidder behavior in recurring road construction procurement auctions. The study reveals that projects are spatially correlated. When bidders with potential synergies participate, the results indicate that their probability of bidding and winning increases and that they bid more aggressively. Finally, the study shows that a firm that is capacity unconstrained will bid more aggressively than one that is capacity constrained.

Keywords: Auctions, Synergies

JEL Classification: D44

Suggested Citation

De Silva, Dakshina G., Synergies in Recurring Procurement Auctions: An Empirical Investigation. Economic Inquiry, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 55-66, January 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=632928

Dakshina G. De Silva (Contact Author)

Department of Economics, Lancaster University Management School ( email )

Lancaster LA1 4YX
United Kingdom

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
545
PlumX Metrics