The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision

32 Pages Posted: 13 Dec 2004

See all articles by Mika Widgren

Mika Widgren

University of Turku - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Stefan Napel

University of Hamburg - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Date Written: December 2004

Abstract

This paper analyzes the a priori influence of the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) on legislation of the European Union adopted under its codecision procedure. In contrast to studies which use conventional power indices, both institutions are assumed to act strategically. Predicted bargaining outcomes of the crucial Conciliation stage of codecision are shown to be strongly biased towards the legislative status quo. Making symmetric preference assumptions for members of CM and EP, CM is on average much more conservative because of its internal qualified majority rule. This makes CM by an order of magnitude more influential than EP, in contrast to a seeming formal parity between the two "co-legislators".

Keywords: power measurement, European Union codecision procedure, bargaining, spatial voting, decision procedures

JEL Classification: C70, C78, D70, D72

Suggested Citation

Widgren, Mika T. and Napel, Stefan, The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision (December 2004). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1347. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=634222

Mika T. Widgren (Contact Author)

University of Turku - Department of Economics ( email )

FIN-20500 Turku
Finland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Stefan Napel

University of Hamburg - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Von-Melle-Park 5
Hamburg, 20146
Germany

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