The Political Economy of Urban Transport System Choice

36 Pages Posted: 16 Dec 2004

See all articles by Jan K. Brueckner

Jan K. Brueckner

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Harris Selod

National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA); National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - Center for Research in Economics and Statistics (CREST); The World Bank; Paris School of Economics (PSE); World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Date Written: October 2004

Abstract

This Paper analyzes the political economy of transport-system choice, with the goal of gaining an understanding of the forces involved in this important urban public policy decision. Transport systems pose a continuous trade-off between time and money cost, so that a city can choose a fast system with a high money cost per mile or a slower, cheaper system. The Paper compares the socially optimal transport system to the one chosen under the voting process, focusing on both homogeneous and heterogeneous cities, while considering different landownership arrangements. The analysis identifies a bias toward over-investment in transport quality in heterogeneous cities.

Keywords: Over-investment in transport quality, income heterogeneity, multiple transport systems

JEL Classification: H41, R42

Suggested Citation

Brueckner, Jan K. and Selod, Harris, The Political Economy of Urban Transport System Choice (October 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=636042

Jan K. Brueckner (Contact Author)

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics ( email )

3151 Social Science Plaza
Irvine, CA 92697-5100
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Harris Selod

National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA) ( email )

147, rue de l'Universite
Paris Cedex 07, 78-Yvelines 75338
France
+33 1 4313 6365 (Phone)
+33 1 4313 6362 (Fax)

National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - Center for Research in Economics and Statistics (CREST)

15 Boulevard Gabriel Peri
Malakoff Cedex, 1 92245
France

The World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
30
Abstract Views
1,847
PlumX Metrics