Tenure Security and Land-Related Investment: Evidence from Ethiopia

29 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Klaus Deininger

Klaus Deininger

World Bank - Development Economics Group (DEC); World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Songqing Jin

Michigan State University

H.S. Gebre Selassie

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Berhanu Adenew

World Bank

Berhanu Nega

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: 03/07/2003

Abstract

The authors use a large data set from Ethiopia that differentiates tenure security and transferability to explore determinants of different types of land-related investment and its possible impact on productivity. While they find some support for endogeneity of investment in trees, this is not the case for terraces. Transfer rights are unambiguously investment-enhancing. The large productivity effect of terracing implies that, even where households undertake investments to increase their tenure security, this may not be socially efficient. In Ethiopia, government action to increase tenure security and transferability of land rights can significantly enhance rural investment and productivity.

This paper - a product of Rural Development, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to assess the impact of land policy on equity and productive development.

Suggested Citation

Deininger, Klaus and Jin, Songqing and Gebre Selassie, H.S. and Adenew, Berhanu and Nega, Berhanu, Tenure Security and Land-Related Investment: Evidence from Ethiopia (03/07/2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=636353

Klaus Deininger (Contact Author)

World Bank - Development Economics Group (DEC) ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/kdeininger

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Songqing Jin

Michigan State University ( email )

Agriculture Hall
East Lansing, MI 48824-1122
United States

H.S. Gebre Selassie

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Berhanu Adenew

World Bank

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Berhanu Nega

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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