Financial and Legal Institutions and Firm Size

46 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Thorsten Beck

Thorsten Beck

City University London - Sir John Cass Business School; Tilburg University - European Banking Center, CentER

Vojislav Maksimovic

University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business

Asli Demirgüç-Kunt

World Bank - Development Research Group; World Bank

Date Written: March 2003

Abstract

Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic investigate how a country's financial institutions and the quality of its legal system explain the size attained by its largest industrial firms in a sample of 44 countries. Firm size is positively related to the size of the banking system and the efficiency of the legal system. Thus, the authors find no evidence that firms are larger in order to internalize the functions of the banking system or to compensate for the general inefficiency of the legal system. But they do find evidence that externally financed firms are smaller in countries that have strong creditor rights and efficient legal systems. This suggests that firms in countries with weak creditor protections are larger in order to internalize the protection of capital investment.

This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the determinants of firm size.

Suggested Citation

Beck, Thorsten and Maksimovic, Vojislav and Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, Financial and Legal Institutions and Firm Size (March 2003). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2997. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=636359

Thorsten Beck (Contact Author)

City University London - Sir John Cass Business School ( email )

106 Bunhill Row
London, EC1Y 8TZ
United Kingdom

Tilburg University - European Banking Center, CentER ( email )

PO Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Vojislav Maksimovic

University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business ( email )

Van Munching Hall
College Park, MD 20742-1815
United States
301-405-2125 (Phone)
301-314-9157 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://scholar.rhsmith.umd.edu/vmax/home

Asli Demirgüç-Kunt

World Bank - Development Research Group ( email )

United States
202-473-7479 (Phone)
202-522-1155 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/ademirguckunt/

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

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