Explaining Liberalization Commitments in Financial Services Trade

41 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Philipp Harms

Philipp Harms

Study Centre Gerzensee

Aaditya Mattoo

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Ludger Schuknecht

European Central Bank (ECB)

Date Written: March 2003

Abstract

Harms, Mattoo, and Schuknecht examine the determinants of market access commitments in international financial services trade in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Based on a theoretical model, they investigate empirically the role of domestic political economy forces, international bargaining considerations, and the state of complementary policy.

The empirical results confirm the relevance of the authors' model in explaining banking and (to a somewhat lesser degree) securities services liberalization commitments. The findings imply that those who seek greater access to developing country markets for financial services must do more to counter protectionism at home in areas of export interest for developing countries.

This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to assess the implications of liberalizing trade in services. This research was supported in part by the U.K. Department for International Development.

Suggested Citation

Harms, Philipp and Mattoo, Aaditya and Schuknecht, Ludger, Explaining Liberalization Commitments in Financial Services Trade (March 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=636361

Philipp Harms (Contact Author)

Study Centre Gerzensee ( email )

CH-3115 Gerzensee
Switzerland

Aaditya Mattoo

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Room MC 3-327
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-458-8047 (Phone)
202-676-9810 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/amattoo

Ludger Schuknecht

European Central Bank (ECB) ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany
+49 69 1344 6494 (Phone)
+49 69 1344 7809 (Fax)

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