Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=636542
 
 

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Individual Attitudes toward Corruption: Do Social Effects Matter?


Roberta Gatti


World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Stefano Paternostro


World Bank - Poverty Reduction Group (PRMPR)

Jamele Rigolini


New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics

August 2003

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3122

Abstract:     
Using individual-level data for 35 countries, Gatti, Paternostro, and Rigolini investigate the microeconomic determinants of attitudes toward corruption. They find women, employed, less wealthy, and older individuals to be more averse to corruption. The authors also provide evidence that social effects play an important role in determining individual attitudes toward corruption, as these are robustly and significantly associated with the average level of tolerance of corruption in the region. This finding lends empirical support to theoretical models where corruption emerges in multiple equilibria and suggests that big-push policies might be particularly effective in combatting corruption.

This paper - a joint product of Investment Climate, Development Research Group, and the Poverty Group, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network - is part of a larger effort in the Bank to understand the determinants of corruption.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24


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Date posted: April 20, 2016  

Suggested Citation

Gatti, Roberta and Paternostro, Stefano and Rigolini, Jamele, Individual Attitudes toward Corruption: Do Social Effects Matter? (August 2003). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3122. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=636542

Contact Information

Roberta Gatti (Contact Author)
World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )
1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States
Stefano Paternostro
World Bank - Poverty Reduction Group (PRMPR) ( email )
1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-473-3492 (Phone)
202-473-8466 (Fax)
Jamele Rigolini
New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics ( email )
269 Mercer Street, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10011
United States
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