Economic Lot-Sizing Games

24 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 2004

See all articles by Wilco van den Heuvel

Wilco van den Heuvel

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)

Peter Borm

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Herbert Hamers

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Date Written: 17 2004, 11

Abstract

In this paper we introduce a new class of OR games: economic lot-sizing (ELS) games. There are a number of retailers that have a known demand for a fixed number of periods. To satisfy demand the retailers order products at the same manufacturer. By placing joint orders instead of individual orders, costs can be reduced and a cooperative game arises. In this paper we show that ELS games are balanced. Furthermore, we show that two special classes of ELS games are concave.

Keywords: gamet heory, lot-sizing, inventory, production

JEL Classification: M, M11, R4, C71

Suggested Citation

van den Heuvel, Wilco and Borm, Peter E. M. and Hamers, Herbert, Economic Lot-Sizing Games (17 2004, 11). ERIM Report Series Reference No. ERS-2004-088-LIS. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=636804

Wilco Van den Heuvel (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands
+31 10 40 81307 (Phone)

Peter E. M. Borm

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Herbert Hamers

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 4666 2660 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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