Purchase - $5.00

International Cooperation on Domestic Policies: Lessons from the WTO Competition Policy Debate

30 Pages Posted: 28 Dec 2004  

Bernard Hoekman

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Kamal Saggi

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 2004

Abstract

International cooperation is generally driven by a desire to offset a negative spillover imposed by other countries or to help governments to overcome domestic political economy constraints that impede the adoption of welfare enhancing policy changes. In principle, both conditions are satisfied in the competition policy context for developing countries. This then raises the question why no agreement could be reached in the WTO to launch negotiations on competition law. In this Paper, we review what was on the table in the WTO and discuss the lessons that are suggested by the seven-year effort in the WTO to develop a negotiating/cooperation agenda. We argue that the process was a productive one, as it helped identify potential gains from cooperation, although the institutional framework for this has come to lie outside the WTO. A reason for this is that over time the discussions came to focus less on areas where there clearly are spillovers, and more on 'good practices' for domestic enforcement of antitrust law - an area in which the WTO does not have an obvious comparative advantage.

Keywords: Economic development, international cooperation, antitrust, trade negotiations, WTO

JEL Classification: F13, F35, O19

Suggested Citation

Hoekman, Bernard and Saggi, Kamal, International Cooperation on Domestic Policies: Lessons from the WTO Competition Policy Debate (October 2004). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4693. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=639183

Bernard Hoekman (Contact Author)

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies ( email )

Fiesole, Tuscany
Italy

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

Villa La Fonte, via delle Fontanelle 18
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

Kamal Saggi

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Department of Economics ( email )

Dallas, TX 75275
United States
214-768-3274 (Phone)
214-768-1821 (Fax)

Paper statistics

Downloads
49
Abstract Views
1,591