A Silent Battle Over a Cake

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2004-119

14 Pages Posted: 4 Jan 2005

See all articles by Julio Gonzalez Diaz

Julio Gonzalez Diaz

University of Santiago de Compostela - Department of Statistics and Operations Research; Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics and Economic History

Peter Borm

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Henk Norde

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research; Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Date Written: November 2004

Abstract

The division of a cake by n players is modeled as a game of timing. We show that such games admit a unique Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: game of timing; Nash equilibrium

JEL Classification: C72, D61, D63

Suggested Citation

Gonzalez Diaz, Julio and Borm, Peter E. M. and Norde, Henk W., A Silent Battle Over a Cake (November 2004). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2004-119, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=639521 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.639521

Julio Gonzalez Diaz (Contact Author)

University of Santiago de Compostela - Department of Statistics and Operations Research ( email )

Santiago de Compostela, 15706
Spain

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics and Economic History ( email )

Edifici B - Campus Bellaterra
Barcelona, 08193
Spain

Peter E. M. Borm

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Henk W. Norde

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 3245 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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