Agency Problems and Goal Conflicts
FRB of Atlanta Working Paper No. 2004-24
40 Pages Posted: 4 Jan 2005
Date Written: October 2004
Agency theory is used to evaluate how the European Union (EU) may deal with the resolution of goal and agency conflicts in dealing with failing financial institutions. Experience in the United States suggests that the financial and regulatory structure being put in place, which relies upon country-sponsored deposit insurance funds and home country responsibility for supervision and lender-of-last-resort functions, is not likely to be robust to the failure of a large EU institution that threatens the solvency of the deposit insurance fund or that poses systemic risk. The author concludes that the EU needs a centralized and common approach to dealing with troubled institutions.
Keywords: agency problems, banking supervision and regulation, EMU, deposit insurance
JEL Classification: D72, G28, G38, H30
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation