Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=642063
 
 

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Citations (61)



 


 



Returns to Acquirers of Listed and Unlisted Targets


Mara Faccio


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; Purdue University - Krannert School of Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER)

John J. McConnell


Purdue University

David Stolin


Toulouse Business School - Economics and Finance

November 2004


Abstract:     
We examine announcement period abnormal returns to acquirers of listed and unlisted targets in 17 Western European countries over the interval 1996-2001. Acquirers of listed targets earn an insignificant average abnormal return of -0.38%, while acquirers of unlisted targets earn a significant average abnormal return of 1.48%. This listing-related factor in acquirers' returns persists through time and across countries and remains after controlling for the method of payment for the target, the acquirer's size and Tobin's Q, pre-announcement leakage of information about the transaction, whether the acquisition created a blockholder in the acquirer's ownership structure, whether the acquisition was a cross-border deal, and other variables. The fundamental factors that give rise to this listing-related effect, which has also been documented in US acquisitions, remain elusive.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

Keywords: Mergers and acquisitions

JEL Classification: G34


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Date posted: January 4, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Faccio, Mara and McConnell, John J. and Stolin, David, Returns to Acquirers of Listed and Unlisted Targets (November 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=642063 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.642063

Contact Information

Mara Faccio (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
Purdue University - Krannert School of Management ( email )
1310 Krannert Building
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER) ( email )
BIZ 2 Storey 4, 04-05
1 Business Link
Singapore, 117592
Singapore
John J. McConnell
Purdue University ( email )
MGMT, KRAN
403 West State St.
West Lafayette, IN 47907-2056
United States
765-494-5910 (Phone)
765-494-7863 (Fax)
David Stolin
Toulouse Business School - Economics and Finance ( email )
20, bd Lascrosses - BP 7010
Toulouse Cedex 7, 31068
France
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References:  23
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