Take-and-Guess Games

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2004-129

31 Pages Posted: 5 Jan 2005

See all articles by Marcel Dreef

Marcel Dreef

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research; Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Date Written: December 2004

Abstract

This paper studies two classes of two-person zero-sum games in which the strategies of both players are of a special type.Each strategy can be split into two parts, a taking and a guessing part.In these games two types of asymmetry between the players can occur.In the first place, the number of objects available for taking does not need to be the same for both players.In the second place, the players can be guessing sequentially instead of simultaneously; the result is asymmetric information.The paper studies the value and equilibria of these games, for all possible numbers of objects available to the players, for the case with simultaneous guessing as well as for the variant with sequential guessing.

Keywords: zero-sum games, morra, coin-guessing, asymmetric information

JEL Classification: C72

Suggested Citation

Dreef, Marcel and Tijs, Stef H., Take-and-Guess Games (December 2004). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2004-129, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=642424 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.642424

Marcel Dreef (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
B925
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2348 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Via Dodecaneso 35
16146 Genoa
Italy

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