Politically-Connected CEOs, Corporate Governance and Post-IPO Performance of China's Partially Privatized Firms

44 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2005

See all articles by Joseph P. H. Fan

Joseph P. H. Fan

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - School of Accountancy

T.J. Wong

University of Sothern California

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2004

Abstract

Property rules of China's partial share issue privatization have created rent-seeking incentives for politicians that may hurt the performance and corporate governance of newly listed state enterprises. This study reports that almost 28% of the CEOs in the sample of 625 firms are ex- or current government bureaucrats. The three-year post-IPO average stock returns of the sample underperform the market by 20%, and the underperformance of firms with such politically-connected CEOs exceeds those without politically-connected CEOs by almost 30%. Firms with politically-connected CEOs are more likely to appoint other bureaucrats to boards of directors, while they appoint fewer directors with relevant professional background or prior business experience, nor any representative of minority shareholders. The presence of politically-connected CEOs is related to the unemployment and fiscal conditions of the firms' regions while unrelated to most firm characteristics. Overall, the results indicate that the appointment of politically-connected CEOs does not enhance shareholder value but rather fulfill political goals of politicians.

Suggested Citation

Fan, Po Hung Joseph P. H. and Wong, T.J., Politically-Connected CEOs, Corporate Governance and Post-IPO Performance of China's Partially Privatized Firms (December 2004). AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=642441 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.642441

Po Hung Joseph P. H. Fan (Contact Author)

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - School of Accountancy ( email )

Shatin, N.T.
Hong Kong
(852) 26097839 (Phone)
(852) 26035114 (Fax)

T.J. Wong

University of Sothern California ( email )

701 Exposition Blvd
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

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