Is There Any Scope for Corporatism in Stabilization Policies?

32 Pages Posted: 14 Jan 2005

See all articles by Giovanni Di Bartolomeo

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo

Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Economics and Law

Nicola Acocella

University of Rome I - Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and Finance (MEMOTEF)

Wilfried Pauwels

Faculty of Applied Economics UFSIA-RUCA

Date Written: December 2004

Abstract

This paper studies corporatism as the outcome of bargaining between the government and a representative labor union. When negotiations between these two parties only relate to macroeconomic stabilization, we show that corporatism can never be beneficial to both parties. As corporatist policies are nevertheless commonly observed in this context, we also discuss in an informal way possible explanations that reconcile the theory with actual observations. The policy implications of these explanations are also discussed.

Keywords: Social pacts, Axiomatic bargaining, Unions, Issue linkage

JEL Classification: E00, E58, E61, J50

Suggested Citation

Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni and Acocella, Nicola and Pauwels, Wilfried, Is There Any Scope for Corporatism in Stabilization Policies? (December 2004). FEEM Working Paper No. 154.04. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=643623 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.643623

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (Contact Author)

Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Economics and Law ( email )

via Castro del Laurenziano 9
Roma, 00191
Italy

Nicola Acocella

University of Rome I - Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and Finance (MEMOTEF) ( email )

Via del Castro Laurenziano 9
Roma, Roma 00161
Italy
+390649766359 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.memotef.uniroma1.it/newdip/utenti/acocellanicola/

Wilfried Pauwels

Faculty of Applied Economics UFSIA-RUCA ( email )

Prinsstraat 13
Antwerp, B-2000
Belgium
+32 220 4122 (Phone)
+32 3 220 4026 (Fax)

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