Governance and Growth

Posted: 6 Jan 2005

See all articles by Mark Gradstein

Mark Gradstein

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

Because of its inappropriability, protection of property rights is widely recognized as being the state's responsibility. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that it leads to higher investment levels and faster growth. Nevertheless, the extent of property rights protection differs significantly across countries. This paper endogenizes the emergence of property rights within a simple growth framework. Drawing on North, (North, D., 1990, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press), a model is presented where economic performance and enforcement of property rights may reinforce each other. Initial conditions determine the economy's convergence to a high-income or a low-income steady state. The existing empirical evidence offers a tentative support for this theory.

Keywords: Rent seeking, property rights, governance, institutions, growth

JEL Classification: D23, D72, O11, O41

Suggested Citation

Gradstein, Mark, Governance and Growth. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=643789

Mark Gradstein (Contact Author)

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics ( email )

Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel
+97 2 8647 2288 (Phone)
+97 2 8647 2941 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.cesifo.de

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
719
PlumX Metrics