Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=644043
 
 

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Why are IPO Investors Net Buyers through Lead Underwriters?


John M. Griffin


University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance

Jeffrey H. Harris


American University

Selim Topaloglu


Queen's University - Smith School of Business

November 10, 2005

AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings Paper
EFA 2005 Moscow Meetings Paper

Abstract:     
In Nasdaq IPOs between 1997 and 2002, clients of the lead underwriter bought shares worth $35.36 billion on the first day of public trading but sold shares worth only $21.45 billion, leading to a net buy imbalance of $13.91 billion, or 8.79 percent of the shares issued. The strong net buying activity through the lead underwriter is driven by large trades and widely present in IPOs of various degrees of underpricing. We investigate several explanations and find no support for long-term shareholders buying to build larger positions, for clients buying because of superior execution quality, or for clientele effects. Consistent with lead underwriters extracting rents from their clients, client net buying is driven by large trades, persistent even in cold IPOs, greater for underwriters that issue multiple IPOs, coupled with relatively higher transactions costs and associated with more transient institutional ownership. Price contribution analyses show that client net buying through the lead underwriter contributes significantly to first-day price increases.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 60


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Date posted: January 7, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Griffin, John M. and Harris, Jeffrey H. and Topaloglu, Selim, Why are IPO Investors Net Buyers through Lead Underwriters? (November 10, 2005). AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings Paper; EFA 2005 Moscow Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=644043 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.644043

Contact Information

John M. Griffin (Contact Author)
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance ( email )
Red McCombs School of Business
Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-471-6621 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.jgriffin.info

Jeffrey H. Harris
American University ( email )
Kogod School of Business
4400 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20016-8044
United States
202-885-6669 (Phone)
Selim Topaloglu
Queen's University - Smith School of Business ( email )
437 Goodes Hall
143 Union St.
Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6
Canada
613-533-6573 (Phone)
613-533-2321 (Fax)

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