Whistleblowing

12 Pages Posted: 7 Jan 2005

See all articles by R. Rothschild

R. Rothschild

Lancaster University - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 2005

Abstract

This paper analyzes the incentives for 'whistleblowing' on a cartel under different assumptions about market demand and firms' costs. We introduce the concept of a 'critical expected penalty' to demonstrate the crucial role of such demand and cost parameters in determining firms' choices. We identify some counter-intuitive results, and consider what forces may have to obtain in order to explain observed behavior.

Keywords: cartels, cost heterogeneity, whistleblowing.

JEL Classification: D43, L41, L43

Suggested Citation

Rothschild, R., Whistleblowing (January 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=644141 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.644141

R. Rothschild (Contact Author)

Lancaster University - Department of Economics ( email )

Bailrigg
Lancaster LA1 4YX
United Kingdom
+441524594217 (Phone)
+441524594244 (Fax)

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