Whistleblowing
12 Pages Posted: 7 Jan 2005
Date Written: January 2005
Abstract
This paper analyzes the incentives for 'whistleblowing' on a cartel under different assumptions about market demand and firms' costs. We introduce the concept of a 'critical expected penalty' to demonstrate the crucial role of such demand and cost parameters in determining firms' choices. We identify some counter-intuitive results, and consider what forces may have to obtain in order to explain observed behavior.
Keywords: cartels, cost heterogeneity, whistleblowing.
JEL Classification: D43, L41, L43
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Rothschild, R., Whistleblowing (January 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=644141 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.644141
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN
If you need immediate assistance, call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 212 448 2500 outside of the United States, 8:30AM to 6:00PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday.