Not Available for Download

Husbands too can be egalitarian if necessary: An Analysis of intra-marital sharing rules

Posted: 5 Mar 1998  

Nejat Anbarci

Deakin University - Department of Economics

E. Mine Cinar

Loyola University of Chicago - Department of Economics

Abstract

Much of economic theory still considers the household as a homogeneous and harmonious unit where the spouses have equal power. A well-known empirical fact is that women, in general, earn less than men. Several studies suggest that a woman's power within household is related to her income. However, there are many households in which spouses' personal spending levels are more or less egalitarian. Here, we provide a model to show, among other things, that an egalitarian personal spending pattern by the spouses under certain circumstances is consistent with the fact that women typically earn lower wages than men. We focus on two possible types of intra-marital division: egalitarian and proportional. We have a two-stage game. The first stage is the prenuptial stage. At that stage, first the male decides whether or not to propose marriage. If he does not, the parties receive their autarky payoffs forever; if he does, the female can either accept or reject the proposal. If she rejects it, the parties receive their autarky payoffs forever. If she accepts it, the postnuptial stage is reached. In the postnuptial subgame, first the husband decides whether to make an egalitarian offer or a proportional offer. Whichever offer he decides to make has to be accepted by the wife for all periods that follow; otherwise a divorce follows. We identify the circumstances under which in equilibrium (i) egalitarian division within the marriage takes place, (ii) proportional division arises, (iii) divorce takes place, (iv) the male chooses not to propose marriage.

JEL Classification: D39, J12, J16

Suggested Citation

Anbarci, Nejat and Cinar, E. Mine, Husbands too can be egalitarian if necessary: An Analysis of intra-marital sharing rules. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=64488

Nejat Anbarci (Contact Author)

Deakin University - Department of Economics ( email )

70 Elgar road
Burwood, Victoria 3215
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://www.deakin.edu.au/~nejata/

E. Mine Cinar

Loyola University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

820 N. Michigan Ave.
25 E Pearson, Room 1214
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
312-915 6066 (Phone)

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
922