Ec Competition Law and the Regulation of Passive Investments Among Competitors

Posted: 12 Jan 2005 Last revised: 9 Jun 2008

See all articles by David Gilo

David Gilo

Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law

Ariel Ezrachi

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law

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Abstract

Passive holdings and cross-investments among competing companies are common phenomena in the modern marketplace. Yet under certain market conditions such investments may cause anticompetitive effects. This paper explores the economic effects of passive investments and their regulation under European competition law. The paper identifies a range of transactions that potentially affect competition, however remain unchallenged under current EU competition law. Subsequently, the paper explores the possibility of applying the European Merger Regulation to these transactions.

Keywords: Passive investment, EU competition law, Tacit collusion, unilateral effects, merger regulation

Suggested Citation

Gilo, David and Ezrachi, Ariel, Ec Competition Law and the Regulation of Passive Investments Among Competitors. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 26, p. 327-349, 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=646782

David Gilo (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law ( email )

Ramat Aviv
Tel Aviv 69978, IL
Israel
+972-3-6406299 (Phone)

Ariel Ezrachi

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )

Oxford
United Kingdom

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