Policies for Banking Crises: A Theoretical Framework

39 Pages Posted: 24 Jan 2005

See all articles by Rafael Repullo

Rafael Repullo

Centre for Monetary and Financial Studies (CEMFI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: November 2004

Abstract

This Paper analyzes the effects on ex ante risk-shifting incentives and ex post fiscal costs of three policies that are frequently used in dealing with banking crises, namely, forbearance from prudential regulations, extension of blanket deposit guarantees, and provision of unrestricted liquidity support. In the context of a simple model of information-based bank runs, where banks are funded with both insured and uninsured deposits, the paper shows that the expectation of implementation of any of these policies leads to a reduction in the interest rate of uninsured deposits and in the bank's incentives to take risk, but increases the expected fiscal costs of the crises.

Keywords: Banking crises, bank runs, bank supervision, risk-shifting incentives, forbearance, deposit insurance, lender of last resort

JEL Classification: E58, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

Repullo, Rafael, Policies for Banking Crises: A Theoretical Framework (November 2004). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4727. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=648035

Rafael Repullo (Contact Author)

Centre for Monetary and Financial Studies (CEMFI) ( email )

Casado del Alisal 5
28014 Madrid
Spain
+34 91429 0551 (Phone)
+34 91429 1056 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cemfi.es/~repullo/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

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