Dynamic Inefficiencies in Insurance Markets: Evidence from Long-Term Care Insurance

23 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2005  

Amy Finkelstein

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Amir Sufi

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; NBER

Kathleen M. McGarry

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: January 2005

Abstract

We examine whether unregulated, private insurance markets efficiently provide insurance against reclassification risk (the risk of becoming a bad risk and facing higher premiums). To do so, we examine the ex-post risk type of individuals who drop their long-term care insurance contracts relative to those who are continually insured. Consistent with dynamic inefficiencies, we find that individuals who drop coverage are of lower risk ex-post than individuals who were otherwise-equivalent at the time of purchase but who do not drop out of their contracts. These findings suggest that dynamic market failures in private insurance markets can preclude the efficient provision of insurance against reclassification risk.

Suggested Citation

Finkelstein, Amy and Sufi, Amir and McGarry, Kathleen M., Dynamic Inefficiencies in Insurance Markets: Evidence from Long-Term Care Insurance (January 2005). NBER Working Paper No. w11039. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=648942

Amy Finkelstein (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Amir Sufi

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

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NBER

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Kathleen M. McGarry

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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