Using Hit Rates to Test for Racial Bias in Law Enforcement: Vehicle Searches in Wichita

32 Pages Posted: 21 Jan 2005

See all articles by Nicola G. Persico

Nicola G. Persico

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Petra Todd

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: January 12, 2005

Abstract

This paper considers the use of outcomes-based tests for detecting racial bias in the context of police searches of motor vehicles. It shows that the test proposed in Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001) can also be applied in a more general environment where police officers are heterogenous in their tastes for discrimination and in their costs of search and motorists are heterogeneous in their benefits and costs from criminal behavior. We characterize the police and motorist decision problems in a game theoretic framework and establish properties of the equilibrium. We also extend of the model to the case where drivers' characteristics are mutable in the sense that drivers can adapt some of their characteristics to reduce the probability of being monitored. After developing the theory that justifies the application of outcomes-based tests, we apply the tests to data on police searches of motor vehicles gathered by the Wichita Police department. The empirical findings are consistent with the notion that police in Wichita choose their search strategies to maximize successful searches, and not out of racial bias.

Keywords: Racial Profiling, Crime, Police, Wichita

JEL Classification: J70, K42

Suggested Citation

Persico, Nicola G. and Todd, Petra, Using Hit Rates to Test for Racial Bias in Law Enforcement: Vehicle Searches in Wichita (January 12, 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=651862 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.651862

Nicola G. Persico (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States

Petra Todd

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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