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Concentrated Power: The Paradox of Antitrust in Japan

42 Pages Posted: 31 Jan 2005  

Harry First

New York University School of Law

Tadashi Shiraishi

University of Tokyo - Graduate Schools for Law and Politics

Abstract

Many reasons have been given for weak antitrust enforcement in Japan. In this paper we explore one reason that has been overlooked - the concentration of enforcement authority in Japan's Fair Trade Commission.

The paper begins with a description of Japan's antitrust enforcement system, with a particular focus on the current position and activities of the JFTC. We then compare Japan's system to the antitrust enforcement system that has evolved in the United States, primarily to provide the contrast of a system where enforcement is more deconcentrated and enforcers operate in a networked environment rather than in a hierarchical one. We conclude with three suggestions for opening up antitrust enforcement in Japan: Increase the networking of the JFTC and other ministries regarding competition matters; strengthen the support structure for private litigation; and encourage the JFTC to participate fully in the growing internationalization of antitrust enforcement.

JEL Classification: K22

Suggested Citation

First, Harry and Shiraishi, Tadashi, Concentrated Power: The Paradox of Antitrust in Japan. LAW IN JAPAN, University of Washington Press, 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=652505

Harry First (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6211 (Phone)
212-995-4760 (Fax)

Tadashi Shiraishi

University of Tokyo - Graduate Schools for Law and Politics ( email )

7-3-1 Hongo Bunkyo-Ku
Tokyo, 113-0033
Japan
+81-3-5841-3127 (Phone)
+81-3-5841-3125 (Fax)

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