Local Loop Unbundling: One-Way Access and Imperfect Competition

International University in Germany Working Paper No. 27/2004

24 Pages Posted: 24 Jan 2005

See all articles by Paul de Bijl

Paul de Bijl

CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis

Martin Peitz

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics

Date Written: December 2004

Abstract

This paper analyzes one-way access and, in particular, local loop unbundling (LLU) in telecommunications markets. At present, LLU seems most promising as a means for entrants to offer broadband internet access. As voice telephony can be implemented by using the 'internet protocol' when consumers have broadband access, LLU may, in the end, spur competition in markets for voice telephony as well. Thus LLU is an important way to stimulate competition in the broadly defined market for fixed telecommunications. In this paper we explore situations of one-way access in which the entrant, the firm without the essential input, has market power. We first review the nature of LLU when there is full consumer participation. Next, we explore the case of partial participation, where the entrant can attract further participation. In the first case, unbundling requirements are neutral to competition. This result breaks down under partial consumer participation. Hence, regulation of unbundling requirements should be particularly concerned with market segments such as broadband access in which partial participation seems to be a key feature.

Keywords: One-way access, essential facility, local-loop unbundling, regulation, telecommunications, fixed telephony, VoIP

JEL Classification: L96, L51, L13

Suggested Citation

de Bijl, Paul W.J. and Peitz, Martin, Local Loop Unbundling: One-Way Access and Imperfect Competition (December 2004). International University in Germany Working Paper No. 27/2004, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=652742 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.652742

Paul W.J. De Bijl

CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis ( email )

P.O. Box 80510
The Hague, 2508 GM
Netherlands
+31 70 3383380 (Phone)
+31 70 3383350 (Fax)

Martin Peitz (Contact Author)

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics ( email )

D-68131 Mannheim
Germany
+49 621 181-1835 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://peitz.vwl.uni-mannheim.de/

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