Properties of Scoring Auctions

28 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 2005

See all articles by John Asker

John Asker

UCLA

Estelle Cantillon

Free University of Brussels (VUB/ULB) - ECARES; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Date Written: November 2004

Abstract

This Paper studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of non monetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behavior in scoring auctions when suppliers' private information is multidimensional (characterization of equilibrium behavior and expected utility equivalence) and show that scoring auctions dominate several other commonly used procedures for buying differentiated products.

Keywords: Procurement, multi-attribute, multidimensional private information, auction

JEL Classification: D44, L14, L24

Suggested Citation

Asker, John William and Cantillon, Estelle, Properties of Scoring Auctions (November 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=653826

John William Asker (Contact Author)

UCLA ( email )

8283 Bunche Hall
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477
United States

Estelle Cantillon

Free University of Brussels (VUB/ULB) - ECARES ( email )

Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50 - C.P. 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
+32 2 650 3840 (Phone)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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