Do Analyst Conflicts Matter? Evidence from Stock Recommendations

45 Pages Posted: 31 Jan 2005  

Anup Agrawal

University of Alabama - Culverhouse College of Commerce & Business Administration

Mark A. Chen

Georgia State University - Department of Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 2007

Abstract

We examine whether conflicts of interest with investment banking and brokerage induce sell-side analysts to issue optimistic stock recommendations and, if so, whether investors are misled by such biases. Using quantitative measures of potential conflicts constructed from revenue breakdowns of analyst employers, we find that the level of analysts' stock recommendations is indeed positively related to the magnitude of the conflicts they face. The optimistic bias stemming from investment banking conflict was especially pronounced during the late-1990s stock market bubble. However, evidence from the response of stock prices and trading volumes to upgrades and downgrades suggests that the market recognizes analyst conflicts and properly discounts analyst opinions. This pattern persists even during the bubble period, contrary to popular belief that investors threw caution to the wind during the bubble. Moreover, the one-year performance of revised recommendations is unrelated to the magnitude of conflicts. Overall, our findings do not support the view that conflicted analysts are able to systematically mislead investors with optimistic stock recommendations.

Keywords: Stock analysts, security analysts, analyst conflicts, corporate governance, stock recommendations, wall street research, brokerage research, conflicts of interest

JEL Classification: G14, G24, G28, G29, G34, G38, K22, M41

Suggested Citation

Agrawal, Anup and Chen, Mark A., Do Analyst Conflicts Matter? Evidence from Stock Recommendations (July 2007). Robert H. Smith School Research Paper No. RHS 06-38; EFA 2005 Moscow Meetings Paper; AFA 2006 Boston Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=654281 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.654281

Anup Agrawal (Contact Author)

University of Alabama - Culverhouse College of Commerce & Business Administration ( email )

Culverhouse College of Commerce
EFLS, Box 870224
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0224
United States
205-348-8970 (Phone)
205-348-0590 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://culverhouse.ua.edu/faculty/profile/4

Mark Chen

Georgia State University - Department of Finance ( email )

University Plaza
Atlanta, GA 30303-3083
United States

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