Adjustable Supply in Uniform-Price Auctions: The Value of Non-Commitment

28 Pages Posted: 31 Jan 2005

See all articles by David McAdams

David McAdams

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA)

Date Written: March 2005

Abstract

In uniform-price auctions, the seller sometimes retains flexibility to adjust the total quantity sold after receiving the bids, or simply lacks the ability to commit to a schedule of reserve prices (or supply curve). In this paper, I show that the seller raises more revenue in equilibrium given such adjustable supply than by committing to any supply curve.

Keywords: uniform-price auctions

Suggested Citation

McAdams, David, Adjustable Supply in Uniform-Price Auctions: The Value of Non-Commitment (March 2005). MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4522-05, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=657462 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.657462

David McAdams (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA) ( email )

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