Gangs and Crime Deterrence

36 Pages Posted: 2 Feb 2005

See all articles by Abdala Mansour

Abdala Mansour

Centre interuniversitaire sur le risque, les politiques économiques et l'emploi (CIRPÉE)

Nicolas Marceau

Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Economiques et l'Emploi (CIRPEE)

Steeve Mongrain

Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2005

Abstract

A framework is developed in which the formation of gangs - the criminal market structure - is endogenous. As in standard models of crime, under a given gang structure, an increase in deterrence reduces criminal output. However, under identifiable circumstances, an increase in deterrence can lead to an increase in the number of competing criminal gangs and to an increase in total illegal output, possibly accompanied with a fall in the price. We show that an increase in demand can also modify the criminal market structure and ultimately affect the output and the price in a similar way.

Keywords: Criminal gangs, formation, crime deterrence

JEL Classification: K42

Suggested Citation

Mansour, Abdala and Marceau, Nicolas and Mongrain, Steeve, Gangs and Crime Deterrence (January 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=658461 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.658461

Abdala Mansour

Centre interuniversitaire sur le risque, les politiques économiques et l'emploi (CIRPÉE) ( email )

Ste-Foy, Quebec G1K 7P4
Canada

Nicolas Marceau

Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Economiques et l'Emploi (CIRPEE) ( email )

Ste-Foy, Quebec G1K 7P4
Canada

Steeve Mongrain (Contact Author)

Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Department of Economics ( email )

8888 University Drive
Burnaby, British Columbia V5A 1S6
Canada
604-291-3547 (Phone)
604-291-5944 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.sfu.ca/~mongrain/

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
124
Abstract Views
1,292
rank
224,452
PlumX Metrics