Can a Carbon Permit System Reduce Spanish Unemployment?

University of Oslo Economics Working Paper No. 26/2004

50 Pages Posted: 3 Feb 2005

See all articles by Taran Faehn

Taran Faehn

Statistics Norway - Research Department

Antonio G. Gómez‐Plana

Public University of Navarre - Department of Economics

Snorre Kverndokk

Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research

Date Written: December 2004

Abstract

This paper analyses whether recycling revenues from carbon emission permit auctions can reduce unemployment in the Spanish economy. Spain's deviation from EU's intermediate emission goals is more serious than for most other EU countries, and the unemployment is also well above the EU average. We use a CGE model that includes a matching model with two types of labour, and which allows for different pricing rules and returns-to-scale assumptions. We find that abatement reduces unemployment due to beneficial impacts of recycling the revenue from permit sales. Unemployment is more effectively abated when revenues are used to reduce labour taxes rather than indirect taxes. Contrary to other studies of Europe, we find that the best option is to reduce payroll taxes on skilled labour. This reform is the most successful both in increasing demand and in dampening the supply response to rising wages. All the recycling schemes also generate dividends in terms of welfare, but none offset the abatement costs entirely.

Keywords: Spanish unemployment, Tax reform, Emission Permit Auctions, Employment dividend, Matching functions, Increasing returns to scale, Computable general equilibrium models

JEL Classification: D58, J68, Q38

Suggested Citation

Faehn, Taran and Gomez-Plana, Antonio G. and Kverndokk, Snorre, Can a Carbon Permit System Reduce Spanish Unemployment? (December 2004). University of Oslo Economics Working Paper No. 26/2004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=659461 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.659461

Taran Faehn (Contact Author)

Statistics Norway - Research Department ( email )

Kongens Gt. 6
PO Box 8131 Dep
N-0033 Oslo
Norway

Antonio G. Gomez-Plana

Public University of Navarre - Department of Economics ( email )

Campus de Arrosadia
Pamplona, Navarra 31006
Spain

Snorre Kverndokk

Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research ( email )

Gaustadalleen 21
N-0349 Oslo
Norway
+47 22958811 (Phone)
+47 22958825 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.frisch.uio.no/cv/snorrek_eng.html

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