Multinational Enterprises, International Economic Organisations and Convergence Among Legal Systems' Non-State Actors and International Law 2: 23–39, 2002

Non-State Actors and International Law, Vol. 2, pp. 23-39, 2002

16 Pages Posted: 10 Feb 2005 Last revised: 7 May 2010

Date Written: May 7, 2010

Abstract

The article explores the existence, nature and impact of the market for 'legal products', and in particular the role of non state actors such as multinational enterprises (MNEs) and international economic organisations (IEOs) in that market. It considers IEOs as producers of legal reform models; states as consumers of legal reform models and producers of resulting legal systems; and MNEs as consumers of resulting legal systems. It argues that the market for legal reform products is oligopolistic, and thus not fully competitive; that competition does currently exist in the market for legal systems, due to the large number of state producers; but that such competition as exists is likely to fall as legal systems are forced to converge under the increasingly dominant of legal reform product offered by IEOs; that such convergence might occur naturally with regard to those aspects of legal systems as to which consumers such as MNEs hold, and act upon, homogenous preferences; but that to force convergence in those aspects of legal systems as to which consumers hold heterogeneous preferences interferes with competitive forces and is thus potentially damaging.

Keywords: Convergence, multinational enterprises, legal reform, World Bank

Suggested Citation

Perry-Kessaris, Amanda, Multinational Enterprises, International Economic Organisations and Convergence Among Legal Systems' Non-State Actors and International Law 2: 23–39, 2002 (May 7, 2010). Non-State Actors and International Law, Vol. 2, pp. 23-39, 2002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=665001

Amanda Perry-Kessaris (Contact Author)

Kent Law School ( email )

Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NS
United Kingdom

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