Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

School Meals, Educational Achievement, and School Competition: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation

52 Pages Posted: 16 Feb 2005  

Christel Vermeersch

World Bank

Michael Kremer

Harvard University - Department of Economics; Brookings Institution; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Center for Global Development; Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Date Written: November 2004

Abstract

Vermeersch and Kremer examine the effects of subsidized school meals on school participation, educational achievement, and school finance in a developing country setting. They use data from a program that was implemented in 25 randomly chosen preschools in a pool of 50. Children's school participation was 30 percent higher in the treatment group than in the comparison group. The meals program led to higher curriculum test scores, but only in schools where the teacher was relatively experienced prior to the program. The school meals displaced teaching time and led to larger class sizes. Despite improved incentives, teacher absenteeism remained at a high level of 30 percent. Treatment schools raised their fees, and comparison schools close to treatment schools decreased their fees. Some of the price effects are caused by a combination of capacity constraints and pupil transfers that would not happen if the school meals were ordered in all schools. The intention-to-treat estimator of the effect of the randomized program incorporates those price effects, and therefore it should be considered a lower bound on the effect of generalized school meals. This insight on price effects generalizes to other randomized program evaluations.

This paper - a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management 2, Africa Technical Families - is part of a larger effort in the region to increase our understanding of the impact of programs aimed at reaching the Millennium Development Goals.

Suggested Citation

Vermeersch, Christel and Kremer, Michael, School Meals, Educational Achievement, and School Competition: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation (November 2004). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3523. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=667881 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.667881

Christel Vermeersch

World Bank ( email )

Michael R. Kremer (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

Littauer Center
Rm. 207
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Brookings Institution

1775 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20036-2188
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Center for Global Development

2055 L St. NW
5th floor
Washington, DC 20036
United States

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
686
Rank
30,311
Abstract Views
3,497