Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=668131
 
 

References (44)



 
 

Citations (42)



 


 



Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter


Daniel Lederman


World Bank - Latin America and Caribbean Region

Norman Loayza


World Bank - Research Department

Rodrigo R. Soares


Columbia University - School of International & Public Affairs (SIPA)


Economics & Politics, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 1-35, March 2005

Abstract:     
This study uses a cross-country panel to examine the determinants of corruption, paying particular attention to political institutions that increase accountability. Even though the theoretical literature has stressed the importance of political institutions in determining corruption, the empirical literature is relatively scarce. Our results confirm the role of political institutions in determining the prevalence of corruption. Democracies, parliamentary systems, political stability, and freedom of press are all associated with lower corruption. Additionally, common results of the previous empirical literature, related to openness and legal tradition, do not hold once political variables are taken into account.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35


Date posted: February 16, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Lederman, Daniel and Loayza, Norman and Soares, Rodrigo R., Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter. Economics & Politics, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 1-35, March 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=668131

Contact Information

Daniel Lederman
World Bank - Latin America and Caribbean Region ( email )
1818 H Street NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States
HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/danielledermanworldbank/
Norman Loayza
World Bank - Research Department ( email )
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States
Rodrigo R. Soares (Contact Author)
Columbia University - School of International & Public Affairs (SIPA) ( email )
420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States
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