Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter

35 Pages Posted: 16 Feb 2005

See all articles by Daniel Lederman

Daniel Lederman

World Bank - Latin America and Caribbean Region

Norman Loayza

World Bank - Research Department

Rodrigo R. Soares

Columbia University - School of International & Public Affairs (SIPA); Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - Sao Paulo School of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Abstract

This study uses a cross-country panel to examine the determinants of corruption, paying particular attention to political institutions that increase accountability. Even though the theoretical literature has stressed the importance of political institutions in determining corruption, the empirical literature is relatively scarce. Our results confirm the role of political institutions in determining the prevalence of corruption. Democracies, parliamentary systems, political stability, and freedom of press are all associated with lower corruption. Additionally, common results of the previous empirical literature, related to openness and legal tradition, do not hold once political variables are taken into account.

Suggested Citation

Lederman, Daniel and Loayza, Norman and Soares, Rodrigo R., Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter. Economics & Politics, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 1-35, March 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=668131

Daniel Lederman

World Bank - Latin America and Caribbean Region ( email )

1818 H Street NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/danielledermanworldbank/

Norman Loayza

World Bank - Research Department ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Rodrigo R. Soares (Contact Author)

Columbia University - School of International & Public Affairs (SIPA) ( email )

420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - Sao Paulo School of Economics ( email )

Rua Itapeva 474 s.1202
São Paulo, São Paulo 01332-000
Brazil

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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