Insurance in a Market for Credence Goods

18 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 2005

See all articles by Kai E. Sülzle

Kai E. Sülzle

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Achim Wambach

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research; University of Mannheim; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

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Abstract

We study the impact of variations in the degree of insurance on the amount of fraud in a physician-patient relationship. In a market for credence goods, where prices are regulated by an authority, physicians act as experts. Due to their informational advantage, physicians have an incentive to cheat by pretending to perform inappropriately high treatment levels leading to overcharging patients. Our approach aims on the impact on changes in each, patients' and physicians' incentive structure when the proportional degree of coinsurance varies. It is shown that a higher coinsurance rate may lead to either less fraud in the market and a lower probability of patients searching for second opinions or more fraud and more searches.

Suggested Citation

Sülzle, Kai E. and Wambach, Achim, Insurance in a Market for Credence Goods. Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 72, No. 1, pp. 159-176, March 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=669221

Kai E. Sülzle (Contact Author)

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ( email )

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Achim Wambach

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

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University of Mannheim ( email )

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