Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria

13 Pages Posted: 2 Mar 2005

See all articles by Michael Finus

Michael Finus

University of Stirling

Pierre van Mouche

Wageningen University

Bianca Rundshagen

University of Hagen

Date Written: February 2005

Abstract

We provide an existence and a uniqueness result for coalitional equilibria of a game in strategic form. Both results are illustrated for a public good game and a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly game.

Keywords: Existence and uniqueness of coalitional equilibrium, Game in strategic form

JEL Classification: C71

Suggested Citation

Finus, Michael and van Mouche, Pierre and Rundshagen, Bianca, Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria (February 2005). FEEM Working Paper No. 23.05. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=670083 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.670083

Michael Finus (Contact Author)

University of Stirling ( email )

Stirling, Scotland FK9 4LA
United Kingdom

Pierre Van Mouche

Wageningen University ( email )

Hollandseweg 1
6700 HB Wageningen, 6706KN
Netherlands

Bianca Rundshagen

University of Hagen ( email )

Profilstr. 8
Hagen, D-58084
Germany

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